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Abstract
We study competing mechanism games in which principals simultaneously design
contracts to deal with several agents. We show that principals can profit from privately
communicating with agents by generating incomplete information in the continuation
game they play. Specifically, we construct an example of a complete information game
in which none of the (multiple) equilibria in Yamashita (2010) survives against unilat-
eral deviations to mechanisms involving private communication. This also contrasts
with the robustness result established by Han (2007). The role of private communi-
cation we document may call for extending the standard construction of Epstein and
Peters (1999) to incorporate this additional element.
∗Toulouse School of Economics and University of Rome Tor Vergata, e-mail: andrea.attar@tse-fr.eu
†University of Rome Tor Vergata, e-mail: eloisa.campioni@uniroma2.it
‡Ipag Business School Paris, e-mail: piaser@gmail.com
1
1 Introduction
We study competing mechanism games: principals compete through mechanisms in the
presence of multiple agents. Such a strategic scenario has become a reference framework to
model competition in a large number of market settings.1
As first pointed out by McAfee (1993) and Peck (1997), the equilibrium allocations
derived in these contexts crucially depend on the set of mechanisms made available to prin-
cipals. For example, letting agents communicate to principals additional information on top
of their “exogenous” type typically supports additional allocations at equilibrium.2 This
raises the issue of identifying a class of mechanisms allowing to reveal all information avail-
able to agents, including that generated by the mechanisms posted by principals. In an
important contribution, Epstein and Peters (1999) have introduced a communication device
that incorporates this market information. In their general construction, a mechanism for
each principal requires each agent to send messages from a universal type space. The cor-
responding set of equilibrium allocations may be very large: Yamashita (2010) shows that
a subset of such mechanisms, i.e. the recommendation mechanisms, is sufficient to derive
a folk-theorem-like result. In a recommendation mechanism, a principal commits to post a
particular direct mechanism if all but one agent recommend him to do so. Recommendation
mechanisms hence allow to construct a flexible system of punishments: following a unilat-
eral deviation of a given principal, agents can coordinate to select, amongst his opponents’
decisions, those inducing the most severe punishment to the deviator.3 As a result, any
incentive compatible allocation yielding each principal a payoff above a given threshold can
be supported at equilibrium if there are at least three agents.
The present work reconsiders this indeterminacy result from a traditional mechanism
design perspective. That is, we evaluate the strategic role of a principal privately com-
municating with agents as in the canonical Myerson (1982) analysis. Standard approaches
to model competing mechanisms disregard this possibility, by restricting each principal to
communicate by publicly committing to take some decisions given the messages that agents
privately send him. Yet, to the extent that he cannot directly contract on his opponents’
mechanisms, a single principal may in principle gain by sending private signals to agents so
to correlate their behaviors with all principals’ decisions.
Specifically, we focus on a simple class of complete information competing mechanism
1See Peters (2014) for a recent survey.
2This result, which has been documented in single agent contexts by Martimort and Stole (2002) and
Peters (2001), is often acknowledged as a failure of the revelation principle in games with multiple principals.
3This logic extends to multiple agency the role played by menus and latent contracts under common
agency (Martimort and Stole, 2002; Peters, 2001).
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games, in which agents’ actions are contractible. In such a scenario, we construct an example
that explicitly characterizes the set of (multiple) equilibrium allocations supportable by
recommendation mechanisms. In a next step, we show that none of the corresponding
equilibria survives against a deviation to a well chosen mechanism in which the principal
correlates his decisions with the private signals he sends to agents. Since signals are private,
the deviation induces an incomplete information game between agents. In the example, only
one agent becomes perfectly informed of the decision selected by the deviating principal,
while the others remain uninformed. This difference crucially affects the unique continuation
equilibrium of the agents’ effort game, generating a joint probability distribution over agents’
efforts and principals’ decisions that cannot be reproduced without private signals.
The result suggests that the equilibrium allocations characterized by allowing only agents
to privately communicate through (possibly) large message spaces may not be robust against
unilateral deviations toward mechanisms incorporating principals’ private communication.
In this respect, we provide novel insights for applications. Economic models of competing
mechanisms under complete information restrict attention to situations in which only pay-
for-effort contracts are posted. That is, a principal does not ask for messages, and takes
decisions contingent on agents’ observable efforts which, in this context, identifies a direct
mechanism. This is, for instance, the approach followed by Prat and Rustichini (2003) to
model lobbying and vertical restraints among market interactions. An implication of our
analysis is that this restriction is problematic once principals are allowed to design more
sophisticated mechanisms. This stands in contrast with the result of Han (2007) who shows
the robustness of equilibria supported by pay-for-effort contracts against unilateral deviations
to mechanisms that only allow for agents’ private communication.
A crucial feature for our result is the presence of many agents. In single-agent environ-
ments, any correlation between the agent’s actions and his opponents’ decisions, induced by
any principal’s deviation to a mechanism with signals, can be reproduced using mechanisms
without signals.
Several folk-theorem results have been recently established in the competing mechanism
literature. Generalizing the approach of Yamashita (2010), Peters and Troncoso-Valverde
(2013) show that, under complete information, the outcomes supported at equilibrium by
recommendation mechanisms correspond to those implementable in the mechanism design
setting of Myerson (1979). Their analysis is casted in an abstract setting in which every
player has commitment power, and a player’s decisions are only enforced if all other players
send him the same message. We consider, instead, the simpler context in which only a given
subset of players is able to commit, as postulated in most economic applications, and analyze
the robustness of pure strategy equilibria to the introduction of private communication for
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principals. A different strategy is followed by Kalai et al. (2010), Peters and Szentes (2012),
Peters (2015), and Szentes (2015) who provide different attempts at modeling contractible
contracts. These works show that by posting contracts that directly refer to each other,
instead of asking agents to report their observed mechanisms, a principal may successfully
deter his opponents deviations. In these settings, a folk theorem obtains even if no commu-
nication takes place after mechanisms are posted, which severely limits the strategic role of
agents and therefore the power of the deviations we exploit.
This note is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the competing mechanism model,
Section 3 presents our example, Section 4 provides a general discussion, and Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 The model
We study competing mechanism games of complete information in which the agents’ actions
are observable. There is a finite number J ≥ 2 of principals dealing with a finite number
I of agents. Each agent i = 1, 2, · · · , I takes an effort ei from a finite set Ei, with e =(
e1, . . . , eI
)
∈ E = I×
i=1
Ei. Let Yj be the finite set of actions available to principal j with
yj ∈ Yj a generic element of that set, and Y =
J×
j=1
Yj. The functions ui : E × Y → R and
vj : E × Y → R denote the payoff to agent i and to principal j, respectively.
Agents’ efforts are observable, so each principal j can choose an action yj contingent on
the array of efforts e. We denote αj : E1 × ...× EI −→ ∆(Yj), a pay-for-effort contract for
principal j, with ∆(Yj) being the set of probability distributions over Yj. A pay-for-effort
contract hence specifies a (possibly stochastic) action for every array of observed efforts. We
let Aj be the set of pay-for-effort contracts for principal j with αj ∈ Aj, and we denote
A = J×
j=1
Aj.
2.1 Competing mechanism games: equilibrium
We now describe a standard competing mechanism framework for complete information
settings.4 Communication occurs via the private messages sent by agents to principals, and
the public mechanisms principals commit to. Specifically, we let mij ∈ M ij be a private
message sent by agent i to principal j. A mechanism for principal j is the mapping γj :
Mj → Aj, in which Mj =
I×
i=1
M ij is the set of message profiles that principal j receives from
4We follow Epstein and Peters (1999) and Han (2007).
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agents, with typical element mj =
(
m1j , . . . ,m
I
j
)
. We denote ΓMjj the set of mechanisms
available to principal j, and we let ΓM =
J×
j=1
ΓMjj .
The competing mechanism game unfolds as follows. First, principals simultaneously post
mechanisms. Then, agents simultaneously take effort and communication decisions, and
payoffs are determined. We let µi : ΓM → ∆ (M i) be the message strategy of agent i, with
M i =
J×
j=1
M ij , and ηi : ΓM ×M i → ∆ (Ei) be her effort strategy. We denote βi = (µi, ηi) a
strategy for agent i, and β = (β1, . . . , βI) a profile of strategies. A pure strategy for principal
j is a mechanism γj ∈ ΓMjj . We let U i(γj, γ−j, β) and Vj(γj, γ−j, β) be the corresponding
expected utilities for agent i and principal j, respectively. We denote GM the game in
which agents send messages to principals through the sets (M1, ...,M I) and principals post
mechanisms γ = (γj, γ−j) ∈ ΓM .
We focus here on the subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of GM in which principals
play pure strategies. We say that the agents’ strategies (βi, β−i) constitute a continuation
equilibrium relative to ΓM if for every i and for every γ ∈ ΓM , βi maximizes U i (γ, βi, β−i).
The strategies (γ, β) constitute a SPNE in GM if β is a continuation equilibrium and if,
given γ−j and β, for every j = 1, · · · J : γj ∈ argmax
γ′j∈Γ
Mj
j
Vj
(
γ′j, γ−j, β
)
.
As first documented by Epstein and Peters (1999), the set of equilibrium outcomes may
crucially depend on the characteristics of the message spaces (M1, ...,M I). In this complete
information scenario, we focus on two situations.
1. Each message space M ij is a singleton. That is, principals are only allowed to post pay-
for-effort contracts, specifying a (possibly stochastic) decision for every array of observed
efforts. In this setting, a pay-for-effort contract coincides with a direct mechanism. We
denote GD the direct mechanisms game. As we discuss in Section 4, this game is relevant
for most economic applications.
2. Each message space M ij coincides with the set of pay-for-effort contracts Aj. That is, the
message spaces are sufficiently rich to allow every agent to communicate a direct mechanism
to each principal j. We denote this game GA. Given these message spaces, Yamashita (2010)
shows that a folk-theorem-like result can established.5
2.2 Robustness: principals’ private communication
Our aim is to evaluate whether the equilibria of a given game GM survive in a more general
game in which principals can also privately communicate to agents. Private communication is
5Yamashita (2010)’s result is provided in a general incomplete information scenario. We revisit his
construction in Section 3.
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modeled following the standard approach developed in Myerson (1982). That is, we consider
the following enlarged game. Given the array of messages mj ∈Mj received from the agents,
each principal j can now send a private signal sij ∈ Sij to each agent i. A mechanism for
principal j is hence the mapping γˆj : Mj → ∆ (Aj × Sj), in which Sj =
I×
i=1
Sij. Thus, given
the messagesmj he receives, and the efforts e chosen by agents, the mechanism γˆj determines
a joint probability distribution over his decisions in Yj and his signals in Sj. As in Myerson
(1982), we postulate that agent i privately observes the realization of each signal sij and
can therefore revise her prior information accordingly. Let ΓMjSjj be the set of mechanisms
available to principal j, and denote ΓMS =
J×
j=1
ΓMjSjj . Throughout the paper, we refer to
γˆj ∈ ΓMjSjj as to a mechanism with signals.
Mechanisms are publicly observed, but the message from agent i to principal j and the
signal from principal j to agent i are only observed by i and j. Since signals are private, a
principal can generate incomplete information among agents at the stage of choosing their
efforts. There are two stages at which agent i moves in the game. First, having observed
the mechanisms γˆ = (γˆ1, . . . , γˆJ), she sends an array of messages mi = (mi1, . . . ,miJ) to the
principals. Second, having observed her private signals si = (si1, . . . , siJ), each agent i then
chooses an effort ei ∈ Ei. We take µˆi : ΓMS → ∆ (M i) to be the message strategy of agent
i, and ηˆi : ΓMS ×M i × Si → ∆ (Ei) to be her strategy in the effort game, with Si = J×
j=1
Sij.
We correspondingly let βˆi = (µˆi, ηˆi) be a strategy for agent i. We denote GMS the game
in which agents send messages to principals through the sets (M1, ...,M I), principals post
mechanisms γˆ ∈ ΓMS and send signals to agents through the sets (S1, ..., SJ).
Observe that, for each given (M1, ...,M I), the game GM can be interpreted as a degener-
ate GMS game in which each Sij set is a singleton. In particular, we can write Γ
Mj
j ⊆ ΓMjSjj
for each j and Sj, and specify any mechanism γj as a degenerate γˆj in which, for every pair
(mj, e), the probability distribution over Yj coincides with γj(mj, e) for each sij ∈ Sij.6
Following Peters (2001), we say that an equilibrium (γ, β) of GM is robust if, in every
enlarged game, the original equilibrium survives to a unilateral deviation of a principal
toward a more sophisticated mechanism. That is, if there exists at least one continuation
equilibrium of the enlarged game which makes the deviation unprofitable.7
6A similar reasoning is used by Peters (2001) and Han (2007) to specify a direct mechanism as a degenerate
indirect one.
7See Peters (2001), p. 1364, for a formal definition.
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3 The role of private communication: an example
This section establishes a non-robustness result. We construct a set of equilibrium outcomes
of a given game GM and show that none of them survives if a principal can deviate to mech-
anisms with signals, that allow him to privately communicate with agents. More formally,
we show that there exist equilibria in the game GM that cannot be supported in an enlarged
game with signals GMS.
The result is important from the viewpoint of economic applications, which typically
do not consider this channel of communication. In particular, we revisit the folk-theorem
result established by Yamashita (2010), which is central to the recent developments of the
competing mechanisms literature.
We therefore consider the game GA, as defined in Section 2, in which M ij = Aj for each
i = 1, . . . , I and j = 1, . . . , J . In GA, every agent i communicates a pay-for-effort contract,
i.e. a direct mechanism, to each principal j. Following Yamashita (2010), we say that
γRj : (Aj)I × E −→ ∆(Yj) is a recommendation mechanisms for principal j if:
γRj (mij, . . . ,mIj ) =
 αj if |
{
i : mij = αj
}
| ≥ I − 1
any α¯j ∈ Aj otherwise.
A recommendation mechanism can be understood as having agents suggest to a principal
the direct mechanism to be selected. The principal commits to follow any such recommen-
dation if it is sent by at least I − 1 agents. Theorem 1 in Yamashita (2010) shows that,
if principals post recommendation mechanisms, then every incentive compatible allocation
yielding each principal a payoff above a given threshold can be supported at equilibrium.8 For
every unilateral deviation of a principal, the recommendation mechanisms of his opponents
permit to the agents to implement a corresponding punishment to the deviator, which is key
to compute the threshold payoff. Although Yamashita’s analysis is developed in a general
incomplete information setting, with agents taking no actions, the result naturally applies
to the complete information framework we consider. Yet, a fundamental question is whether
the corresponding equilibria survive the introduction of principals’ private communication
via mechanisms with signals.
To analyze this issue, we construct an example of a complete information GA game,
8In the incomplete information setting of Yamashita (2010), an incentive compatible allocation is an
array of principals’ decisions induced by a continuation equilibrium in which agents truthfully report their
(exogenous) private information given the posted mechanisms.
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in which recommendation mechanisms support multiple equilibrium allocations, and then
show that none of these equilibria survives against a principal’s unilateral deviations to
mechanisms with signals.
Example. Consider a complete information setting with five players: two principals, P1
and P2, and three agents, A1, A2 and A3, who take contractible actions in the sets E1 =
E2 = {a, b} and E3 = {a}. Let P1’s decision set be Y1 = {y11, y12}, and P2’s one be
Y2 = {y21, y22}. The payoffs of the game are represented in the matrix below, in which
the first two numbers in each cell denote the payoffs to P1 and P2, respectively, and the
remaining three numbers denote the payoffs to A1, A2 and A3.
y21 y22
a b a b
y11 a (2, 95, 10, 5, 1) (2, ζ, 3/2, 8, 1) a (2, ζ,−1/10, 0, 1) (2, ζ,−1/10, 8, 1)
b (2, 0, 0, 0, 1) (2, ζ, 0, 10, 1) b (2,−1, 5, 5, 1) (2, ζ, 1,−1, 1)
a b a b
y12 a (2, 95, 10, 5, 1) (2, ζ, 3/2, 8, 1) a (2, ζ,−1, 4, 1) (2, ζ,−1, 8, 1)
b (2, 5, 5, 5, 1) (2, ζ,−1, 4, 1) b (2,−1, 0, 0, 1) (2, ζ, 0,−1, 1)
Table 1: The full payoff matrix of the game
In Table 1, the payoffs to P1 and A3 are constantly equal to 2 and to 1 respectively, we
let ζ < −1 be a loss for P2.9 For the sake of simplicity, in the rest of the discussion we
will use the reduced matrix below, in which we only report the payoffs of P2, A1 and A2,
respectively.
y21 y22
a b a b
y11 a (95, 10, 5) (ζ, 3/2, 8) a (ζ,−1/10, 0) (ζ,−1/10, 8)
b (0, 0, 0) (ζ, 0, 10) b (−1, 5, 5) (ζ, 1,−1)
a b a b
y12 a (95, 10, 5) (ζ, 3/2, 8) a (ζ,−1, 4) (ζ,−1, 8)
b (5, 5, 5) (ζ,−1, 4) b (−1, 0, 0) (ζ, 0,−1)
Table 2: The reduced payoff matrix
In this example, a pay-for-effort contract can be conveniently represented by means of
simple binary distributions over principals decisions. Specifically, we let δe = prob(y11|e) be
9The value of ζ is used to identify the threshold value for P2 along the lines of Yamashita (2010). See
Proposition 1 and, specifically, equation (1) for an explicit characterization of the values of ζ which sustain
the result.
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the probability with which P1 plays y11 if the effort array e ∈ {a, b}2 is observed. That
is, we write α1 = (δaa, δab, δba, δbb). Similarly, we let σe = prob(y21|e) be the probability
with which P2 plays y21 if the effort array e ∈ {a, b}2 is observed. That is, we write
α2 = (σaa, σab, σba, σbb).
A (stochastic) allocation induced by the direct mechanisms (α1, α2) and the agents con-
tinuation strategies (η1, η2, η3) induced by (α1, α2) is the array
z =
(
Σeδeη1(e1|α1, α2)η2(e2|α1, α2),Σeσeη1(e1|α1, α2)η2(e2|α1, α2), η1(.|α1, α2), η2(.|α1, α2), {a}
)
,
in which ηi(ei|α1, α2) is the probability with which agent i plays ei given (α1, α2). Thus, for a
given e = (e1, e2), δeη1(e1|α1, α2)η2(e2|α1, α2) is the probability of y11 given the mechanisms
(α1, α2) and the continuation strategies (η1, η2, η3), and σeη1(e1|α1, α2)η2(e2|α1, α2) is the
corresponding probability of y21. Eventually, ηi(.|α1, α2) is the probability distribution over
ei for agent i = 1, 2.
We hence say that a (stochastic) allocation z is incentive feasible if (η1, η2, η3) is an
equilibrium in the continuation game induced by (α1, α2).10 We first point out two features
of the set of incentive feasible allocations ZIF that are key to our analysis.
Remark 1 Any allocation supported in an equilibrium of GA is incentive feasible.
Remark 2 ZIF is non-empty. In particular, it includes the deterministic allocation z1 =
(y12, y21, a, b, a). Indeed, if P1 commits to play {y12} regardless of the agents’ efforts, and P2
commits to {y22}, then it is a continuation equilibrium for A1 to play {a}, for A2 to play
{b} and for A3 to play {a}. This implements the payoffs (2, ζ, 3/2, 8, 1). A similar reasoning
guarantees that ZIF also includes the allocation z2 = (y11, y22, b, a, a), which implements the
payoff profile (2,−1, 5, 5, 1). Finally, it also includes the allocation z3 = (y12, y21, b, a, a),
sustained by pay-for-effort contracts such that P1 who commits to play y12 when observing
the efforts (b, a, a), and y11 otherwise; and P2 who commits to play y21 when observing
the efforts (b, a, a), and y22 otherwise, so that (b, a, a) is a continuation equilibrium for the
agents. This allocation implements the payoff profile (2, 5, 5, 5, 1).
Remark 1, which directly follows from the definition of incentive feasibility, parallels
Lemma 1 in Yamashita (2010). The multiplicity of incentive feasible allocations documented
10Observe that Yamashita (2010) restricts attention to deterministic allocations. That is, agents play pure
strategies in every continuation equilibrium, and principals cannot randomize over their decisions. Under
this restriction existence of a continuation equilibrium is not guaranteed. We enlarge the analysis to random
behaviors, therefore allowing for mixed strategy equilibria in each continuation game played by the agents.
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in Remark 2 suggests the possibility to derive a folk-theorem-like result in the Example. This
is established in the following analysis.
Proposition 1 Every incentive feasible allocation yielding at least −1 to P2 can be sustained
in an equilibrium of the game GA in which principals play pure strategies.
Proof. Let each principal j = {1, 2} use the recommendation mechanism γRj defined above.
To show that any incentive feasible allocation yielding each principal a payoff above the
threshold level −1 can be sustained at equilibrium, we first establish the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 If P1 plays a given recommendation mechanism, then, for every pay-for-effort
contract posted by P2, there exists an equilibrium in the agents’ game yielding P2 a payoff
lower than (or equal to) −1.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let γR1 be the recommendation mechanism played by P1. For each
pay-for effort contract α2 = (σaa, σab, σba, σbb) posted by P2, agents play a continuation game
over the messages to send to P1 and over their efforts.
In this game, we construct the agents’ equilibrium message strategy in such a way that
they select a pay-for-effort contract (direct mechanism) α1 ∈ A1 such that δab = δba = 1 and
δbb = σbb in the recommendation mechanism of P1. Given these messages, and recalling that
A3 can only take one action, agents A1 and A2 play the effort game in Table 3.
a b
a 11σaa + 910σba(1− σaa)− 1, σaa + 4(1− δaa + δaaσaa) 85σab − 110 , 8
b 5(1− σba), 5(1− σba) 0, σbb(6σbb + 5)− 1
Table 3: The effort game played by A1 and A2
Observe that in this game there is no pure strategy equilibrium in which A1 and A2 play
(a, a). Indeed, if A1 plays a, A2 will choose b because 8 > σaa + 4(1− δaa + δaaσaa) for every
(σaa, δaa) pair.
Thus, when A2 chooses b, A1’s payoff by choosing a is 8/5σab − 1/10 which is positive
if σab ≥ 1/16. In this case, (a, b, a) is an equilibrium in the agents’ game and P2’s payoff is
equal to ζ < −1.
Alternatively, if σab < 1/16, A1’s payoff from choosing a when A2 chooses b is strictly
lower than zero. In this case, for every (σba, σbb) such that σbb(6σbb + 5) − 1 ≥ 5(1 − σba),
(b, b, a) is an equilibrium of the agents’ game, and P2’s payoff is again equal to ζ < −1.
Consider now any (σba, σbb) such that σbb(6σbb + 5)− 1 < 5(1− σba). If A1 plays b, it is
then optimal for A2 respond with a. Now, for each (σaa, σba) such that 11σaa + 9/10(1 −
10
σaa)− 1 ≤ 5(1−σba), (b, a, a) is an equilibrium in the agents’ game for each δaa ∈ [0, 1]. The
corresponding payoff for P2 is −(1− σba) ≤ −1.
Finally, for each (σaa, σba) such that 11σaa + 9/10δaa(1− σaa)− 1 > 5, we set δaa = 1. It
follows that the agents’ game has a mixed strategy equilibrium in which A1 and A2 randomize
over (a, b), while A3 plays {a}. For any such (σaa, ..., σbb), and given the corresponding
(δaa, ..., δbb), we let φ be the probability with which A1 plays a, and τ that with which A2
plays a. The payoff to P2 in this completely mixed equilibrium is φτ(10σaa + ζ(1− σaa))−
(1− φ)τ(1− σba) + (1− τ)ζ. We choose ζ to guarantee that this payoff is smaller than −1.
This is the case if
ζ < ζ¯ ≡ min
σaa,σba
(1− φ)τ(1− σba)− 1− φτ10σaa
φτ(1− σaa) + (1− τ) . (1)
Observe that the fraction that defines ζ¯ takes finite values for every (σaa, σba), and given
the induced mixed strategy equilibrium (φ, τ). Indeed, if σaa = 1, the mixed strategy
equilibrium degenerates to (φ = 1, τ = 0). It follows that ζ¯ is well defined.
To complete of the proof of the lemma, it is enough to remark that, for each profile of
mechanisms (γR1 , α2), it is an equilibrium in the agents’ game to send messages to P1 so to
select δab = δba = 1, δbb = σbb, and δaa as determined above, and to play the corresponding
equilibrium efforts. This is a direct implication of the fact that P1 uses a recommendation
mechanisms in the presence of three agents. As a consequence, following any deviation of P2
to a pay-for-effort contract α2, agents coordinate on a continuation equilibrium that yields
him at most −1. 
This reasoning reproduces that of Lemma 2 of Yamashita (2010) and shows that −1 is
the threshold payoff for P2. Hence, as in Theorem 1 of Yamashita (2010), every incentive
feasible allocation yielding P2 at least a payoff of −1 can be sustained at equilibrium. 
It then follows from Remark 2 that all (incentive feasible) deterministic allocations can
be supported at equilibrium except those yielding P2 the minimal payoff ζ. The following
lemma characterizes, in addition, the maximal payoff available to P2 among all incentive
feasible allocations.
Lemma 2 There is no allocation z ∈ ZIF yielding P2 a payoff strictly greater than 5.
Proof. For a given profile of pay-for-effort contracts, α1 = (δaa, δab, δba, δbb) and α2 =
(σaa, σab, σba, σbb), since A3 can only play {a}, we analyze the effort game played by A1 and
A2, that is
11
a b
a 10σaa − (1− δaa + 110δaa)(1− σaa), 32σab − (1− δab + 110δab)(1− σab), 8
5σaa + 4(1− δaa)(1− σaa)
b 5(1− σba)δba + 5σba(1− δba), δbb(1− σbb)− σbb(1− δbb),
5(1− σba)δba + 5σba(1− δba) 10δbbσbb + 4σbb(1− δbb)− (1− σbb)
which coincides with the game in Table 3, without assuming δab = δba = 1 and δbb = σbb. We
therefore have the following
a b
a 11σaa + 910δaa(1− σaa)− 1, 52σab + 910δab(1− σab)− 1, 8
σaa + 4(1− δaa + δaaσaa)
b 5(σba + δba)− 10σbaδba, δbb − σbb,
5(σba + δba)− 10σbaδba σbb(6δbb + 5)− 1
Table 4: The efforts’ game played by A1 and A2, induced by (α1, α2)
The inequality ζ < ζ¯ postulated in (1) guarantees that P2’s payoff is strictly below 5 in
any fully mixed equilibrium of the agents’ game. For P2 to get a payoff strictly above 5,
principals’ mechanisms should be designed so to guarantee that there exists an equilibrium
in which (a, a) is chosen with positive probability and at most one agent randomizes.
First, observe that A2 strictly prefers to choose b rather than a whenever σaa + 4(1 −
δaa + δaaσaa) < 8, which can be rewritten as σaa(1 + 4δaa) < 4(1 + δaa). It is immediate
to check that the inequality is satisfied for every δaa ≥ 0, and σaa ≥ 0. Thus, there is no
equilibrium in which A1 plays a and A2 randomizes between a and b.
Next, consider the case in which A2 plays a. Then, it must be σaa = 1, otherwise P2 will
get ζ with positive probability. In this case, A1 will never randomize between a and b. In
fact, by playing a she gets 10 > 5(σba + δba)− 10σbaδba ∈ [0, 5] for every σba ≥ 0 and δba ≥ 0.
Hence, there is no incentive feasible allocation yielding P2 a payoff strictly above 5. 
Taken together, Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 imply that recommendation mechanisms
can sustain as equilibria of the game GA all incentive feasible allocations which yield a
payoff above -1 and at most equal to 5 to P2. This provides a generalized version of the
Yamashita (2010) main theorem in a complete information setting in which random behaviors
are allowed.11
11See Xiong (2013) for a version of the folk theorem of Yamashita (2010) that does not rely on the
restriction to deterministic behaviors.
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We now show that none of these equilibria survives if we allow for private communication
from principals to agents. That is, we show that, if P1 plays a recommendation mechanism,
then P2 can get a payoff strictly above 5 by using a mechanism with signals. As a consequence
the (pure strategy) equilibria of GA are not robust, since there exists a specific GMS game,
and a corresponding profitable deviation for P2 . This is formally shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider a game GMS, in which M ij = Aj for every (i, j), Si2 = {a, b} and
Si1 is a singleton for every i. Suppose that, in this game, P1 posts the recommendation
mechanism γR1 . Then, there is a γˆ2 ∈ ΓA2S22 which yields P2 a payoff strictly greater than 5
in every continuation equilibrium.
Proof. In this game GMS, P2 can send private signals to agents, from the set Si2 = {a, b} for
every i. Consider the following probability distribution over such signals: with probability
k > 0 he privately communicates a to all agents, with probability (1 − k) he privately
communicates b to A1 and a to A2 and A3. All the other signals are sent with probability
zero. Let P2 associate to such signals a simple decision rule, which selects y21 when (a, a, a) is
sent, and and y22 when (b, a, a) is sent, for every combination of agents’ efforts and messages.
We denote this deviating mechanism γˆ2.
The mechanisms
(
γR1 , γˆ2
)
generate a game of incomplete information between the agents.
Given the private signals they receive, they are differently informed over P2’s decisions, which
crucially affects their effort choices. The corresponding effort game played by A1 and A2
(A3 can only take the effort a) can be described as follows.
While both mechanisms are public, neither the signal received by A1 nor the realization
of the lottery associated to γˆ2 are known to A2 and P1. Specifically, from the perspective
of A1, when she receives the signal a she knows that with probability one P2 has chosen
y21. By choosing a she gets 10 if A2 plays a and 3/2 if A2 plays b. By choosing b, instead,
she gets 5 (1− δba) if A2 plays a and − (1− δbb) if A2 plays b. Playing a is hence a strictly
dominant effort strategy for A1 irrespective of any pay-for-effort contract selected in A1,
i.e. for every δba and δbb. Alternatively, if she receives the signal b she knows that with
probability one P2 chooses y22. By choosing a she gets −(1/10)δaa − (1− δaa) if A2 plays a
and −(1/10)δab − (1− δab) if A2 plays b. By choosing b, instead, she gets 5δba if A2 plays
a and δbb if A2 plays b. Playing b is a strictly dominant effort strategy for A1 for every
(δaa, δab, δba, δbb).
The above remarks allow to pin down A2’s beliefs on A1’s equilibrium behavior. From
the perspective of A2, signals are uninformative, hence she chooses a if:
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k[5δaa + 5(1− δaa)] + (1− k)[5δba] ≥ 8k − (1− k) (2)
which boils down to a condition on k, that is
k ≤ 5δba + 15δba + 4 ,
which is satisfied for every δba if k ∈ (0, 1/4).
Thus, for every array of messages that A1, A2, and A3 may send to P1, i.e. for every
δ = (δaa, δab, δba, δbb), there exists a mechanism γˆ2 with k ∈ (0, 1/4), that induces a unique
equilibrium in the agents’ effort game, in which A1 plays according to the signal she receives,
A2 and A3 play a. This yields P2 a payoff of 95k + (1 − k)(−1) which is strictly greater
than 5 for k > 1/16. Therefore, given P1’s mechanism γR1 , any mechanism γˆ2 in which
k ∈ (1/16, 1/4) guarantees P2 a payoff strictly above 5. 
The logic of the proof of Proposition 2 can be resumed as follows. When posting the
mechanism γˆ2, P2 effectively induces an incomplete information game between the agents.
In particular, given their private signals, A1 and A2 have different posterior probability
distributions over the decisions implemented by P2. Specifically, P2 correlates his decisions
with the signals he sends to agents so that, when receiving his signal, A1 becomes perfectly
informed, while the signal received by A2 is uninformative. This difference crucially affects
the unique continuation equilibrium of the agents’ effort game, generating a joint probability
distribution over E, Y1 and Y2 that cannot be reproduced by any pay-for-effort contract
chosen by P2.
Our analysis shows that the standard construction used to derive folk theorem results in
competing mechanism games heavily relies on restricting principals’ communication to be
public.
4 Discussion
1. The GM game in which each M ij space is a singleton plays a central role in economic ap-
plications. In this game, which we denoted GD in Section 2, competition between principals
takes place in the absence of any private communication, and principals post pay-for-effort
contracts. The game GD provides, in particular, a generalized version of the traditional
models of lobbying of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), Dixit et al. (1997), and Prat and
Rustichini (2003).
It is therefore a relevant question from the viewpoint of applications whether the equi-
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libria of GD survive when principals deviate to more complex mechanisms involving some
communication. Theorem 1 in Han (2007) provides a positive answer, identifying a set of
equilibria that are robust against unilateral deviations to mechanisms with no signals. These
are the pure strategy strongly robust equilibria of GD, that is, the SPNE in which no principal
j can profitably deviate to a mechanism γ′j ∈ Γj, regardless of the continuation equilibrium
selected by agents.12 Thus, a strongly robust equilibrium of GD is also an (strongly robust)
equilibrium of any GM game.
Going back to our example, recall that, as pointed out in Remark 2, there exists an
incentive feasible allocation yielding P2 his maximal payoff of 5. Then, as an implication of
Lemma 2, this allocation can be supported in a strongly robust equilibrium of the game GD.
At equilibrium, P1 plays y12 when observing the efforts (b, a), and y11 otherwise; P2 plays
y21 when observing the efforts (b, a), and y22 otherwise; A1 and A2 play b and a, respectively.
It hence follows by Theorem 1 in Han (2007) that these behaviors constitute an equilibrium
in any GM game. At the same time, however, the proof of Proposition 2 shows that, if P1
plays the mechanism above, then P2 can profitably deviate to the mechanism with signals γˆ2.
Thus, posting these mechanisms does not constitute an equilibrium in a game with signals
GMS. Overall, our analysis suggests that pure strategy equilibria of complete information
games in which principals post pay-for-effort contracts may not be robust against unilateral
deviations towards sophisticated mechanisms.
2. Our example shares with Yamashita (2010) the focus on recommendations mechanisms.
In contrast with Yamashita (2010), however, we do not consider any (exogenous) incomplete
information, and we let agents take (contractible) actions, so to cope with economic appli-
cations. One may therefore ask whether mechanisms with signals keep playing a key role in
pure incomplete information settings. To answer this question, observe that, when informa-
tion is incomplete and principals play recommendation mechanisms, agents take two relevant
decisions. First, they “recommend” to each principal the direct mechanism he should post;
second, they simultaneously report a type to each principal. From the viewpoint of a given
principal j, the messages (types) that agents send to his opponents can be seen as hidden
actions. Indeed, by selecting a profile of decisions in all posted direct mechanisms, such
messages may indirectly affect principal j’s payoff. He may therefore gain by generating
uncertainty amongst agents when they play their message game, using the same logic we
developed when considering the effort game in our example. That is, principal j may design
a mechanism with signals, so to privately communicate with each type of each agent before
messages (types) are sent. The corresponding continuation equilibrium over messages may
12See Han (2007), p. 613, for a formal definition of strongly robust equilibria. The result of his Theorem
1 does not naturally extend to mixed strategy equilibria, as he shows in Example 1.
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induce a correlation between principals’ decisions that cannot be reproduced without private
signals, similarly to the correlation generated between e, y1 and y2 in our example by the
mechanism γˆ2.
3. More generally, we suggest that equilibria supported by standard mechanisms, in which
principals’ private communication is disregarded, do not survive when this restriction is re-
moved. Our example makes this point by simply enlarging the communication opportunities
of P2, who is allowed to choose signals in the set {a, b}. In the corresponding game with
signals, following the deviation to γˆ2, and upon receiving their private signals, agents play
an incomplete information game given the pay-for-effort contract α1 selected in γR1 . It is
therefore natural to ask whether P1 can effectively “block” the deviation to γˆ2 by trying
to extract the agents’ private information it generates. That is, P1 may further ask agents
to communicate this information and modify his decision accordingly. However, this addi-
tional possibility turns out not to be effective since the unique continuation equilibrium of
the agents’ effort game induced by γˆ2 is not affected by any further change in α1. Indeed,
playing in accordance with the received signal is a dominant strategy for A1 regardless of
α1, and the inequality (2) characterizing A2’s best reply holds for every α1 if k ∈ (0, 1/4).
5 Conclusion
Since principals cannot in general be prevented from privately communicating with agents,
our result suggest that further work is needed to identify a “safe” class of mechanisms
supporting robust equilibria. To be relevant for applications, the corresponding messages
and signals must be sufficiently simple and tractable. In this respect, a natural candidate is
the class of direct mechanisms introduced by Myerson (1982) for generalized principal-agent
problems. In complete information settings, they require that the set of signals available to
each principal coincides with the set of agents’ actions. However, were his opponents posting
such mechanisms, principal j may gain by eliciting the agents’ private information embedded
in the signals. To do so, he would need to make signals contingent on each state of the world,
i.e. on each array of his opponents’ signals. Using such a larger signals’ space allows the
deviating principal to support different correlated equilibria in each agents’ continuation
game induced by the different array of signals they may receive from other principals.13
In these circumstances, identifying a robust equilibrium may be very demanding. Indeed,
each −j principal could attempt at sending signals contingent on the (contingent) signals of
13This effect is highlighted in the competing mechanism game with moral hazard presented in Example 1
of Attar et al. (2010).
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principal j, potentially leading to an infinite regress problem. This suggests that there could
be scope for extending the Epstein and Peters (1999) construction to cope with principals’
private communication.
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